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INDIAN RIGHTS
To Sue and Not Be Sued (In State Court)
by Robert H. Abrams






This jurisdictional struggle finds an Indian tribe
seeking access to North Dakota state court to sue non-
Indians for breach of contract arising out of work done
on Indian reservation lands. The state of North Dakota
refused to entertain the suit, relying on a state "door-
closing" statute that expressly conditions Indian access
to state court upon the surrender of tribal immunity to
be sued in state court. The Indians challenge the state's
authority to so limit Indian access to state court.
The case is in the United States Supreme Court for
the second time. Previously, the North Dakota courts
upheld the door-closing statute on a variety of grounds,
many of which implicated difficult questions of federal
law. In its previous decision, the United States Supreme
Court found that the North Dakota Supreme Court may
have relied on an erroneous interpretation of federal
law and therefore vacated the dismissal of the Indian's
suit and remanded the case. The North Dakota SUo
preme Court reinstated its earlier decision, this tinu
taking into account the dictates of federal law explicated
by the United States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court is now faced with
a new set of federal law based challenges to the required
waiver of Indian immunity to suit as a precondition to
Indian use of state courts. While the case seems tied
closely to a very complex array of statutes, the Court's
resolution of the bottom line issues of state-Indian
power relationships are of wider interest.
ISSUES
The ultimate issue is this case is simple: Can the state
of North Dakota refuse to entertain lawsuits by Indian
tribes or individual Indians in its civil courts if the
would-be-plaintiff Indians will not submit to the juris-
diction of those same North Dakota courts for all pur-
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poses? Put slightly differently, can the ability of Indians
to sue in the state court be conditioned on their waiver
of immunity to suit in state court?
Resolving the ultimate issue may require the United
States Supreme Court to ponder a number of funda-
mental precepts about the federal law limitations on the
power ofstates as sovereigns in their relations with tribes
and individual Indians. First, the Supreme Court must
decide if the state's door-closing statute is preempted by,
or otherwise inconsistent with, federal laws governing
Indian rights. Invalidation on this basis would rest on
the supremacy of federal law, especially the federal pol-
icy of respect for tribal sovereignty evident in numerous
congressional enactments and previous United States
Supreme Court decisions. If the North Dakota door-
closing statute survives the Supremacy Clause, it must
next pass muster under an equal protection scrutiny.
Here, the Court must decide if North Dakota can open
its courts to Indians on grounds different and more
restrictive than those on which their courts are open to
non-Indians.
FACTS
Long ago (1974) and far away in North Dakota, the
Indians of the Fort Berthold Reservation contracted
with Wold Engineering and other defendants in this
lawsuit to design and install an on-reservation public
~orks project. When completed, the project would pro-
vide much of the reservation with a reliable and safe
domestic water system. When the system was completed
in 1977 it was, even after attempts at repairs by de-
fendants, alleged to be an unreliable failure for which
damages were sought in 1980 in North Dakota state
court. Thus, as it started out, this case was little rn, I ...
than a simple breach of contract action, raising the most
ordinary sort ofstate lawclaims for damanges.
Wold Engineering did not immediately contest the
merits, choosing instead to argue that the North Dakota
trial court lacked jurisdiction over the lawsuit. The prin-
cipal ground for this defense was the assertion that the
situs of the alleged breach, being on the Indian reserva-
tion, ousted the state court from jurisdiction as a matter
of federal law. The trial court agreed and dismissed the
case.
The tribe appealed to the North Dakota Supreme
Court which affirmed the decision but relied instead on
the chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code
which required a waiver of Indian immunity as a pre-
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condition lor Indian use of the state courts. This rather
unusual statute was held to be authorized by a federal
statute popularly known as Public Law 280, wich did
authorize some exercise of state judicial jurisdiction over
activities on Indian reservations. (See, 321 N.W.2d 510
(N.D. 1982»
The United States Supreme Court granted rertiorari
a first time and speaking through Justice Blackmun,
vacated the decision of the North Dakota courts. The
opinion clarified certain aspects of the application of the
overarching federal statutes and found that it appeared
that the North Dakota Supreme Court might have based
its decision on improper application of federal law (104
S.Ct. 2267 (1984». The North Dakota Supreme Court
after new briefs and argument reinstated its prior deci-
sion, admitting that the prior decision had been based
on erroneous interpretation of federal grounds, but now
finding that the same result could be reached purely on
slate grounds-the non-compliance by the tribe with
section 27-19 (364 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 1985)1' Certiorari
was again sought and granted.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Indian-state sovereignty disputes have a long and
sometimes bitter history that need not be recounted.
This case, at one level, is yet another wager of their
sovereign wills. The state, here North Dakota, is pro-
claiming its sovereign prerogative to limit access to its
courts to Indian plaintiffs that consent to North Dakota
jurisdiction in the event that lawsuits are filed against
them. The Indians on the other side are claiming that
their sovereign immunity is not subject to abrogation by
any action of a state.
It is hard to gauge the significance of this case. The
specific state door-closing statute appears to be unique
to North Dakota. Thus, its constitutionality is not of
immediate moment elsewhere. Similarly, there do not
appear to be numerous other states waiting in the wings
to enact similar statutes in the event that Wold (and the
state of North Dakota) prevail in the litigation.
If the statute is upheld, however, it represents an-
other inroad of tribal sovereignty. Tribes and individual
Indians can be forced to choose between retaining tradi-
tional immunity from state court jurisdiction over on-
reservation disputes and having no access to state court
for on-reservation disputes. This is not a dire Hobson's
choice, for the Indian plaintiff can always retain the
immunity and seek a remedy in either tribal or federal
court, but it may require Indian plaintiffs to forego the
most convenient and efficacious forum. Still, even this
modest detriment to Indians represents an increase in
the power of the states at the expense of the tribes and
individual Indians.
ARGUMENTS
For theAffiliated Tribes (Counsel of Record,john O. Holm, 17
Second Avenue West, Dickinson, ND 58601; telephone (701)
225·6066)
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I. Excluding tribal and individual Indian plaintiffs from
state courts when a similarly circumstanced non-In-
dian would not be excluded violated the due process
and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
2. The slate door-closing statute invidiously discrimi-
nates against persons onthe basis of race and must be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny (i.e., it must be
found to be necessary to support a compelling state
interest) which it cannot survive.
3. The door-closing statute is preempted by governing
federal law because it attempts to regulate Indian
affairs in a manner that is not permitted by governing
federal law.
4. The door-closing statute violates the "open courts"
guarantee of the North Dakota Constitution.
For WoldEngineering (Counsel of Record, Gary H. Lee, 200
Heritage Place, P. O. Box 939, Minot, ND 58702·0939;
telephone (701) 852-3578)
I. The denial of jurisdiction was based on an adequate
and independent state law ground and therefore is
not open to review by the United States' Supreme
Court.
2. The door-closing statute is not preempted by govern-
ing federal law; the statute accepts the offer made by
Congress in P.L. 280 to the states to assume jurisdic-
tional responsibility over Indian country.
3. The challenged statute is immune to equal protection
invalidation because it represents a political compro-
mise between the state of North Dakota and the In-
dian people.
4. The challenged statute is not subject to strict scrutiny
because the use of the racial classification is traceable
to a specific congressional authority.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Supportofthe Affiliated Tribes
Two separate Indian amici filed briefs: the Standing
Rock and Devils Lake Sioux Tribes and Tuttle Mountain
Band of Chippewa Indians. Both attacked the North
Dakota jurisdictional provision as violating due process
and equal protection. The Sioux also claimed that fed-
eral law preempted the statute while the Chippewa
claimed that the statute infringed on tribal sovereignty.
In Support ofWold Engineering
The state of North Dakota in support of its interest
in the application of its jurisdiction statute urged affir-
mance. The principal argument asserted that North
Dakota's statute was authorized by P.L. 280 and the
North Dakota Constitution. The statute does not act as a
total bar to Indian access to the state's courts, but merely
conditions access on Indian waiver of immunity from
suit in that same judicial system. Borrowing and adapt-
ing a phrase popular in equity civil contempt jurispru-
dence, the state argues that the tribes "hold the keys to
the courthouse."
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